Is the North Korea conundrum hopeless?

Throughout this election campaign, both Kerry and Bush have focused intensively on their strategies to resolve the Iraq conundrum. Given this, the first presidential debate’s focus on the candidates’ approaches to the War on Iraq and global terrorism was hardly surprising. However, when asked both candidates what they believed was the gravest threat to the security of the United States, both President Bush and Senator Kerry agreed that nuclear proliferation, especially in North Korea, was of the greatest concern. Bush emphatically remarked, “I agree with my opponent that the biggest threat facing this country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network. And that’s why proliferation is one of the centerpieces of a multiprong strategy to make the country safer.” Despite his inventing the word “multiprong,” Bush’s message came through loud and clear. Both candidates seem sure that their approach will succeed, although the secretive and reclusive nature of North Korea’s government makes it more a game of nuclear roulette than a battle of cunning and realism.

Since the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons first arose, Washington has initiated several unproductive agreements, yielding only unilateral concessions. Nevertheless, both Kerry and Bush still believe they can quash North Korea’s nuclear efforts by using the Wilsonian net of diplomacy, although neither will rule out military action. Simply put, President Bush wants to maintain the current negotiations with North Korea and its neighbors, while Senator Kerry hopes to open direct meetings with North Korea in addition to these multilateral talks.

However, to understand the limitations and possible successes of a Bush or Kerry policy for a nuclearized Korean peninsula, one must examine the diplomatic legacy of the Clinton administration. For the past 15 years, North Korea has been mired in food and energy shortages, becoming increasingly dependent on foreign nations like China for food and energy. However, despite these developmental deficiencies, North Korea has still managed to create the most militarized country in the world, with 20% of its working age men in uniform. Furthermore, after signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, the government began operating an atomic reactor in 1987. In 1992, then President Kim Il-Sung allowed inspectors from the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to examine the country’s nuclear installations. However, North Korea’s government eventually threw out the inspectors, and announced in March 1993 that it intended to withdraw from the NPT.

After North Korea announced its threat to pull out of the NPT, the US immediately engaged in 25th hour diplomacy with President Kim Il-Sung. To help cool the situation, Pyongyang met with one of America’s most celebrated presidents: Jimmy Carter. The following negotiations led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, a pivotal commitment to provide North Korea with food and energy assistance in exchange for nuclear freezes. Soon, the US, Japan, South Korea, and other countries established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), aimed at facilitating the contribution of energy resources to North Korea.

Utilizing a “food for talks” strategy, the US committed $600 million of energy resources to KEDO and $400 million of food aid to North Korea from 1995 to 2002. Washington hoped this would appease Pyongyang and did not pursue further involvement. However, this policy of benign neglect failed as North Korea’s intentions soon changed.

The discovery that North Korea had reneged on its promise and had begun to develop secretly nuclear weapons prompted President Bush to brand the rogue nation as a member of the infamous “axis of evil.” That October, North Korea sent shockwaves through the international community by revealing it had secretly developed nuclear weapons based on uranium enrichment. This enrichment capability came because of an early 1990s arms deal with Pakistan in which Pakistan received ballistic missile technology in exchange for assistance with North Korean nuclear development. However, concerns about North Korea’s nuclear ambition didn’t end there. Fears of North Korean nuclearization reached a new climax in January 2003 when North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT.

In response to the North Korean withdrawal, the Bush Administration tried international isolation as a means of bringing North Korea to its senses. Official policy became avoiding direct contact with North Korea and demanding that the nation achieve the “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of all nuclear programs.

But this policy of isolation failed to bring about any substantive changes in North Korea’s stance. In April 2004, Washington changed its approach, organizing the now famous Six-Party talks. In these talks, the US created a coalition with the four neighbors of North Korea - China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia – in hopes that regional concerns would put additional pressure on Kim Jong-Il China, in particular, holds powerful leverage as its government supplies 90% of North Korea’s oil and 40% of its food.

These multilateral talks, however, have done little to advance the United States’s agenda. The American delegates finally met with the North Koreans in June, but the meeting accomplished little due to the one-sided dialogue. The six nations spent most of the meetings discussing North Korean demands, as the North Koreans claim that they need the weaponry as a deterrent against US “aggression.” While the US is willing to negotiate multilateral security assurances and a Korean peace treaty if North Korea accepts CVID, the North Korean government demands direct assurance that they will not be the victims of an “Iraq-like” attack before complying to dismantle the program. Pyongyang also insists on freezing, rather than dismantling their operations, language that raises intense skepticism in Washington.

But the failure of the current diplomatic system rests on more than the shoulders of the US and North Korea. At this point, China and Russia are acting with increasing sympathy towards the North Koreans. These two countries have also encouraged the United States to interact more directly with Pyongyang. Furthermore, Japan, which has never had official relations with North Korea, is the only country in the coalition to join the US-backed Proliferation Security Initiative, which has curbed illegal exports of drugs and nuclear technology. The tensions within the six-party framework boiled over in August, when North Korea declared that it would not participate in any more six-party talks. Only after coming under significant international pressure did North Korea reverse its decision the following month.
But Pyongyang has still refused to say when it will go forward with the discussions. Colin Powell visited North Korea last month, and on October 23rd declared that the government’s conditions for talks are too strict. The same day, Pyongyang threatened to double its nuclear arsenal, now estimated at four to seven missiles. North Korea is clearly waiting for the outcome of the November election before allowing further progress in the talks.

Kim Jong-Il, who happens to be owner of one of the world’s largest beanie baby collection in addition to being a ruthless dictator, has good reason to believe this election will change the approach America takes in its diplomacy. This difference has served as a focal point in the debates, with Kerry advocating direct relations with North Korea and Bush continuing to reject such a notion. In the first debate, Kerry bluntly stated that he would encourage comprehensive bilateral talks between the US and Pyongyang in addition to the current multi-party talks. When asked whether he wanted to pursue the six-party talks or direct communication, Kerry responded, “Both. I want bilateral talks which put all of the issues, from the armistice of 1952 … [to the current] nuclear issues on the table.”

However, there are several fissures inherent in this plan. Many officials believe that North Korean dismantlement hinges upon China’s cooperation, cooperation that might be undermined should the US enter into talks of its own. Furthermore, North Korea would have less incentive to enter the multilateral talks if it negotiates with Washington bilaterally. Pyongyang has violated past agreements between North Korea and the US, making the US look like Kim Jong-Il’s lackey. Bush pointed to this fact in the second debate: “It is naive and dangerous to take a policy that he suggested the other day, which is to have bilateral relations with North Korea…that’s what President Clinton did. He had bilateral talks with the North Koreans. And guess what happened? [Kim Jong-Il] didn’t honor the agreement. He was enriching uranium. That is a bad policy.”

Because of these concerns, Bush has stuck to his strategy of holding the six-party talks. He has constantly defended this strategy as the only way to achieve substantial cooperation from Pyongyang. Nevertheless, these talks have not accomplished policy objectives. Russia and China continue to side with North Korea, undercutting US diplomatic advances. The sought-after five-nation coalition utilizing its extensive soft power against North Korea is next to non-existent. The negotiations have had virtually no effect on North Korean policy, and Washington remains a bystander in the crisis.

With the reclusive and shifty regime that rules North Korea, nobody can ascertain which approach will work best. It is clear at this point that the multilateral talks are not accomplishing much, as a high-ranking State Department official recently expressed: “We’re stuck. It’s obvious the talks are going nowhere.” But does this mean that the US should return to failed policies of the past? With little insight into which policy can actually make strides after the election, Americans can only do what its government has been doing all too much of - watching and waiting.