Pointing out inconsistencies in the Bush administration’s foreign policy seems to be all the rage. Recently, after outlining what I believe to be Bush’s institutionalist foreign policy strategy in the former Soviet Bloc, a Russian dinner companion pointedly retorted, “What about Uzbekistan?” Even more so than its incarnations in previous administrations, the interventionist Bush Doctrine has placed real pressure on U.S. credibility when dealing with international crises. The modern combination of omnipotent media coverage, economic integration and globalization has placed a severe strain on U.S. integrity by violently exposing policy contradictions. In short, the United States has effectively created a situation where peripheral interests have become more vital than they might otherwise be. On the international level, policymakers have become acutely aware of how an expansive statement of U.S. interests can stretch the United States’ international image fairly thin.

Various groups have estimated that the regime of Islam Karimov killed somewhere between 169 and 1000 protesters last week, making the Andijan massacre the worst committed by a government since Tiananmen Square. Yet despite the broad mandate of the Bush Doctrine, the United States has remained strangely complacent, illuminating what seems to be an escalating tension between U.S. principles and interests. In terms of interests, Uzbekistan has and will continue to be advantageous. Uzbekistan was the first to offer the United States military assistance after September 11 and allowed us to build a military base that was strategically crucial to the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan.

Now, however, our unquestioning alliance with Uzbekistan has become more burdensome than useful. After the successful invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Uzbekistan has only added to our laundry list of problems. Karimov’s tactics have crossed the line of activities conscionable by both the United States and international observers. Some accounts of tyrannical oppression include claims that dissidents are boiled alive. As such, our policies towards Uzbekistan not only lay the United States wide open for claims of hypocrisy, but also threaten to send the wrong message to other tyrannical regimes: that legitimacy can be gained by strong-arm tactics if a country makes itself a strategic ally of the United States.

The fact that Karimov has categorically rejected requests for an international probe about recent events has only compounded the situation. The United States’ weak pressure on the regime to open up to the probe by threatening to slice the country’s yearly 22 million dollars in aid has drawn criticism from the international community as insufficient. Stronger pressure seems necessary if the United States wishes to salvage its credibility.

But the Uzbekistan massacre does not beg a U.S. response simply to reduce the strain of ostensible credibility gaps. If an Uzbekistani revolution occurs, the likelihood that a legitimate candidate will step up to fill the ensuing power vacuum is minute. Unlike the recent “color revolutions” of neighboring countries, the revolution in Uzbekistan is neither likely to be peaceful nor easy. The revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan all centered on popular former administrators, which is a situation conspicuously absent in Uzbekistan: nearly all of the country’s strong pro-democratic voices have been forced into exile.

The cause for the recent uprising is likely deep and widespread dissatisfaction with the country’s economic and political policies, rather than “Islamic terrorists” as Karimov has deftly alleged. Karimov seems to think that policies of brutal oppression can indefinitely avert domestic unrest. However, the country’s political climate seems to indicate this line of thought inconsistent: if current policies continue, a revolution will inexorably come.

Revolution would be dangerous for several reasons. The lack of a transitional candidate would most likely plunge the country into an absolute state of chaos begging eventual intervention by foreign forces. The turmoil may subsequently upset nearby Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and cause other former Soviet countries to experience conservative backlashes. A real domino effect could ensue, causing many recent and expensive gains in the region to be for naught.

For reasons of both regional security and credibility, the situation in Uzbekistan warrants a hasty and strong U.S. response. The Andijan massacre has blown the cover off of what may be a ticking time bomb for the entire region. The United States has but one choice if our policies are to be successful: to use the entire arsenal of United States economic and political force in order to pressure Karimov’s regime to reform. Certainly, a necessary armed intervention in this region of the world would be the last thing the United States wants to happen, but unless it acts quickly and efficiently such an intervention may lie in the not-too-distant future.