As I was channel-surfing the other day, it came as quite a shock to me that the young whippersnappers of today can play Trivial Pursuit 1990s Edition and relive what is advertised as “the most trivial of decades.” Perhaps I’m just a wee-bit resentful that half my life has suddenly been relegated to the nostalgia aisle at Toys R Us, but calling the Nineties trivial  are you kidding me? This was after all the decade that began with nothing less than the collapse of the Evil Empire, an event that was anything but inconsequential. The mighty U.S.S.R. imploded in 1991 and the decades-old Cold War rivalry suddenly evaporated into thin air. In the area of nuclear policy, the dismemberment of the Soviet Union rendered the Cold War-era methods of standoffish nuclear brinkmanship obsolete in one swift stroke.

Unfortunately, while this turn of events did reduce the need for bloated nuclear arsenals, it did not eradicate the worries of living in the nuclear age. If anything, this geopolitical upheaval did a great deal to complicate the equation. What, for example, was to be done with the colossal stock of nuclear warheads amassed by both the superpowers? Given that the inadequately secured and maintained Russian stockpile was particularly prone to decay and pilfering, tackling the disarmament issue was definitely a high priority. As the decade progressed, however, even greater threats were posed by the rapid proliferation of nuclear capabilities and in particular, the budding nuclear aspirations of rogue states and extra-national groups.

For the most part, however, the policy paradigm for managing nuclear weapons has failed to evolve adequately to meet these post-1991 challenges. The dramatically altered nuclear landscape of the twenty-first century presents a completely new set of challenges that need to be dealt with effectively. To that end, I wholeheartedly agree that we need to radically rethink our established blueprint for preventing the spread of nuclear arms (the bedrock of which is formed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an agreement that went into effect way back in 1970).

Many have also claimed that the success of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament strategies hinges on the U.S. and Russia taking on leadership roles by working to reduce existing stockpiles. Depending on U.S. and Russia to prod the rest of the world into action by providing good examples, however, is not the answer. This type of reason is in fact both illogical and a serious misdiagnosis of the present-day nuclear threat. Those who complain that these former foes are not doing enough to disarm or lament the fact that U.S. Senate rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are simply frozen in the Cold War-era mindset. Obviously, I am a proponent of both nations accelerating their disarmament plans, but any such move would be little more than a symbolic gesture. First of all, partial disarmament at any scale would do very little to dilute either nation’s effective nuclear firepower (after all, an arsenal of a hundred nukes isn’t much more comforting than one boasting a thousand warheads).

Moreover, although this would have been a great measure to institute at the height of the Cold War, it seems very out of place given the fact that the prospect of the U.S. and Russia blowing each other to smithereens nowadays is quite far-fetched. In the absence of heated conflict between superpowers, the state-initiated use of nuclear weapons has become a receding menace. Even as constantly bickering archenemies India and Pakistan have joined the club of nuclear nations, the near-certain potential for mutual devastation has greatly diminished the probability of a nation actually using nuclear weapons. Ironically, as nuclear weapons capabilities have spread, the growing club of nuclear-capable nations has come to realize that WMDs can also stand for weapons of mutual destruction. Taking into account that the likelihood of retaliation has increased exponentially, they have become less willing to seriously consider employing the nuclear option. Nuclear status has therefore become more of a protective shield that serves as a powerful military deterrent to unfriendly designs, an essential tool within the aggressive repertoire of diplomatic rhetoric, as well as a symbolic badge of honor in the international community at-large.

The real problem arises when rogue states or non-state entities with nothing to lose realize their nuclear ambitions. Unhindered by the future costs that figure heavily into the calculations of legitimate nuclear powers, these rogue bodies could easily make use of nuclear arms to achieve their ends. Yet the current formulation of nuclear policy does not do all too much in way of addressing this very real threat. The various treaties and agreements have admittedly done a great deal to create a framework for a coherent nuclear policy, but we should focus on preventing the spread of nuclear technology to the most likely users – rogue states and terrorists. The present course of tightening controls on existing, essentially self-restrained nuclear powers does not attack the root of the problem. The relentless attention devoted to U.S. and Russian policies merely serves to distract the world away from the grave dangers of nuclear technology misuse and proliferation posed by rogue regimes and terrorist groups. Let us first eliminate the immediate menace of terrorists unleashing nuclear Armageddon, and then tackle the less threatening (albeit, very serious) issue of disarmament.