In January of 2007, Ban Ki Moon took over Koffi Annan’s position as UN Secretary General, a transition which has been met with much distrust and uncertainty by the rest of the world’s ambassadors. And, in his still-green tenure, Moon has managed to rack up a number of complaints concerning his inadequacy, his uncharismatic personality, and the lack of transparency which pervades his negotiating procedures. Many onlookers worry that his character traits will not last the many challenges facing Moon’s UN, especially as the world continues to face the war on terror. Indeed, these spectators may be right.

Moon, naturally, rejects these accusations, attributing them to a misinterpretation of what are instead his strong points. According to BBC News, Moon sees himself as a “harmonizer, balancer and mediator.” His lackluster persona and seeming underhandedness should be respectfully attributed, he claims, to his preference of the “back-room deal over the grand public gesture.”

Perhaps this undemocratic approach might be better received if it was not accompanied by the several missteps already taken by the new Secretary General.

During a meeting held on February 5th, Moon had supposedly come prepared to discuss the reorganization of current UN bureaucracy. Once under way, however, Moon seemed more interested in brow beating the other UN world leaders into hurried acceptance of his proposals, rather than in hearing their input with thorough political dialogue. According to the New York Times, throughout the meeting there was “little of the consultation, review and justification of changes that countries traditionally expect,” with the ambassadors subordinated to the role of staff members, not collaborators or fellow diplomats.

In his restructuring zeal, Moon has been accused of appointing unqualified people to chief positions. Some ambassadors believe that there is barely any evidence of appropriate screening of recent appointees. Nor is there much evidence that these appointees have enough experience to hold the positions that Moon has bestowed upon them. On this topic Moon remains regrettably quiet.

Further criticisms have arisen relating to Moon’s proposal to bring the disarmament department closer under his jurisdiction, compromising negotiations among other world leaders regarding current policies. Moon’s status as South Korean foreign minister does legitimize his capacity to steer disarmament negotiations, particularly with nuclear weapon-wielding North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il in his back yard. And drawing the department closer to his office may lead to increased efficiency. But with his previous opacity, such a proposal threatens to bring yet more secrecy to his policy creation. The UN, a forum for open international discussion and debate, cannot accept this—even for the sake of expediency.

Moreover, since Moon’s ascension this January, South Korea’s diplomacy has slipped into confusion, resulting in the estrangement of the nation by both the U.S. and Japan. This growing alienation resulted after South Korea, along with China, broke a previous agreement with America and resumed providing North Korea with food. To be fair, both countries fear the domestic economic devastation of Kim Jong-Il’s regime collapsing. China and South Korea also have cause to worry since the regime’s collapse would unleash a flood of refugees into their neighboring countries, as well as a crumbling of North Korean nuclear governance. Broken pledges, however pragmatic, never sit well with the international community.

Moon may be stretched too thin to successfully manage the UN and South Korea’s foreign ministry, particularly considering the burdensome threat posed by North Korea. This is understandable. But upon accepting his two posts, Moon knew the type of commitment he would have to make, and neither excuses nor leeway is acceptable in the office of UN Secretary General. Moon, who has urged the UN to “promise less and deliver more,” needs to start delivering more of his promises.