Drowned Courses
By Shiao-Ke Chin-Lee
Posted October 1, 2007

How floods changed Kim Jong Il's grasp on power
Not long after floods in North Korea killed as many as 50,000 dead and forced 1.5 million to leave their homes, Kim Jong Il changed the way the isolated and sporadic regime interacted with the world. The country began to open, receiving foreign aid and offering to voluntarily end its nuclear program. All these unprecedented actions had many trying to understand an apparent 180-degree turn. Had North Korean ruler Kim Jong Il realized that his goal of putting his country on the world stage could only be achieved through diplomacy? Or was he simply unable to suppress the news of both disaster and aid?
North Korea, notorious for secrecy and obscurity, faced its second devastating flood within the last two years with more frankness than ever before. In the past Pyongyang snubbed the world's generosity and denied the existence of any problems, forfeiting vital aid and creating long-term problems for its tenuous stranglehold on power. Over a decade ago, Pyongyang silenced all news about a famine that may have left millions dead. Three years ago, its government attempted but failed to suppress news about a train explosion that some claim caused massive disruptions in the aging railway infrastructure. But last year, the country asked South Korea, its neighboring enemy with which it is still (technically) at war, for aid after floods killed over a hundred thousand people. Admittedly this reach for help was delayed substantially, because Pyongyang first tried but failed to suppress the news.
This time, however, North Korea responded to the crisis immediately, announcing that it needed foreign aid while the water levels were still high. The batter regime was ready for aid from virtually any country around the world, including its perceived enemies--the United States and South Korea. Evidently, Kim Jong Il had finally realized that to maintain the bare survival of his country, not to mention his grip on power, he might have to seek outside help to rebuild.
Yet this time around, Pyongyang was caught in an unusual situation: Americans were doing more for the people than their government could. It was a move that could cost support but was absolutely necessary. Unwilling to appear incompetent or arrogant, they accepted the aid and made few concessions to their benefactor--namely one with which they were at odds. Pyongyang thus decided two things. First, Kim Jong Il thanked the donor countries and specifically cited the United States (they didn't acknowledge South Korea, which they regard as an American puppet). Then, shortly after South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun pressured President George W. Bush to put a formal end the long-extended Korean war--something that the United States said could only happen with a weapons-free Korea--North Korea announced it would end its program. It later proposed both a timeline to dismantle and invited weapons inspectors to monitor the progress. The end of tensions on the Korean Peninsula seemed to be in sight.
Though it may have seemed that Kim Jong Il just wanted to end the war and give up his nuclear ambitions in order to extend an olive branch to his enemies, he really had a transformative realization: nuclear weapons were not going to be useful. Both Kim Jong Il and his father Kim Il Sung were originally interested in such weapons in order to make North Korea a major player in world affairs. Both had long wanted to use their plans in order to seek a direct, one-on-one dialogue with the United States--not through South Korea, or later, the Six-Party Talks--in order to ensure the legitimacy of their regimes and their grasp on power.
Yet the floods substantially weakened North Korea's relative political importance--even to the United States, a nation hemorrhaging money, political capital, and man-power. Not only would the country receive aid if it ended its nuclear ambitions, but an external peace treaty would also help the struggling iron-rice-bowl economy. Even if they were to disarm themselves, they could still spread nuclear secrets to Syria to achieve the long-coveted goal of high international standing. Therefore, for Pyongyang, having nuclear weapons now or lying about ending a program was of little help; instead, it made perfect sense to achieve old goals with new methods.
North Korea made some very unusual moves these past months. It first openly announced de facto divergence from its traditional course of self-touted self-reliance and asked for aid. Then, the regime unilaterally told the world it would end its decades-old interest in a nuclear arms arsenal and was willing to deal with the international community. Kim Jong Il has realized that in order to stay in power, he must resort to new tactics. Instead of suppressing information, North Korea opened up and requested help; rather than attempting to bully the United States, North Korea thanked Washington publicly and conceded a key contention. North Korea's ruling regime has finally realized that it might need its own sunshine policy with the rest of the world, including the United States, if it is to maintain its grip on society.




