The West is eager to criticize Russia. After all, it is the child of the Evil Empire with little respect for human rights and no free press. The Economist, the International Herald Tribune, and the New York Times among others often publish doomsday op-eds regarding President Putin, coming just short of calling him the anti-Christ. Now, I'm in no position to defend Mr. Putin, but as a Russian, I'd like to clear up some misconceptions and misunderstandings. I am often appalled by the overt bias and simplification in many Western media sources when presenting the situation in Russia; they usually lack an in-depth understanding and nuance. Let's clear some things up.

Russia has a free press. This may come as a surprise, but it is very true. Like with many things in Russia (and elsewhere), this freedom is not perfect. Three television stations are under government control. And while a major source of information, television is not the entire media. Russians have access to a wide spectrum of radio stations, newspapers, and other publications. A lot of anti-government material circulates in Russia without problems.

If you subscribe to that argument that journalists die because President Putin dislikes opposition, a hell lot of people would have been killed by now. The case of Anna Politkovskaya rests unclear. In my opinion, it is silly to point at Putin as the prime suspect. When someone criticizes a war and human rights abuses, gathers dirt on and exposes individuals, she is bound to create enemies. Putin has high ratings and enjoys popular support among the people. The last thing he needs to do is to remove critics. That would be dumb; he has other things to worry about. There are plenty of people involved in the Chechnya war, which Politkovskaya criticized, who could have ordered the assassination.

Putin is not forever. Current Russian stability depends on Putin, and he knows this. He realizes that the current system, with great executive power, has the potential to crumble or become a dictatorship. Recently, Eugene Kolesnikov, a political consultant familiar with Russia's politics, authored an article in which he pondered that Putin's prime minister considerations may actually be a keen political act to strengthen the parliament in Russia. He argues that with his support and managerial skills, Putin could potentially transform the United Russia party, perhaps even amending the constitution later on to give more power to political parties.

Side note: While Putin certainly enjoys his popularity, he is not a power-maniac. A few years ago, the Financial Times published an article in which they predicted that Putin planned to amend the constitution to allow a consecutive third term for presidency. He did not do so, which shows that he values and respects the document, an important sign in a country where the constitution does not start with a capital C.

But what does Putin's move to consider becoming prime minister mean? I do not know. Maybe he does not know himself. But unlike some magazines (Economist), I would refrain from jumping to quick conclusions. Putin as a politician has enormous force in Russia and in the short-term, he maintains stability. He may want to establish some sort of a long-term solution for Russian continuation rather than making a quick exit.

In Russia, pissing off the West is not official protocol. Realpolitik holds that nations act in their self-interest. Putin's foreign policy justly does, too. Russia is not, as Condoleezza Rice called it "belligerent", but pragmatic.

As any country with a long history, an imperial past, and a large territory, Russia would like to establish itself as a regional power. France has done this in Europe; China is trying to do the same thing in the Far East, and so on. That Russia involves itself in the politics of former Soviet republics should not be discounted as imperialism, but should be seen as a strategic policy in which Putin wants to create geopolitical security for Russia. After all, it is much closer to the World's real "belligerent" states than the United States.

Russian foreign policy is quite stable and predictable, if only the West takes off its Cold War goggles. Russia chooses to engage the West in the projects it sees are mutually interesting, such as anti-terrorism and energy issues. However, it becomes more cautious when Russian interests become threatened. For example, Russia did not support a UN Security Council resolution on stricter sanctions on Iran because of its unique relationship with the Middle East and geographical proximity to it (it shares the Caspian Sea, where its Navy fleet is located, with Iran). Russia sticks to diplomatic pressures, recognizing that Iran is a rational state, no matter how irrational it seems abroad.

Once the West (the U.S.) recognizes that Russia would probably not be thrilled with missile installation in Eastern Europe, but will certainly be willing to exchange intelligence information on terrorist activities, then the relationship may become more cordial.

Remember, you're on the outside. Finally, if Russia is a thorn in the West's side, the same goes for the West. In the early 90's, Russia excitedly welcomed the West and its economic reform ideas of shock-therapy and ended up in chaos and economic disaster. Since then and for other reasons, Russians have become apprehensive of Western meddling in Russian internal matters. "If we are stable and constructive," they think, "let us be!" Amen.

The point. I would have liked to discuss the intricacies of Russian domestic politics more, but that is another story. The oligarchs, government autonomy, siloviki... let us not get into that right now. The point is this: The Dartmouth community, and the entire West, needs to approach the politics of Russia with maturity and intelligence. We have a long way to go, but I would like to hope that the analysis of Russian politics is a little more complex than "Putin is leading Russia back to Soviet times."