The India-U.S. Nuclear Deal is on its way. Following nearly three years of debate, deliberation, and bureaucratic hurdles, the United States and India have hailed a deepening in their "newfound strategic partnership". President Bush is expected to sign the treaty into law on October 8, following approval from both houses of Congress this past week.

The India Deal, which has fought against years of contentious dissent in Congress, is formally known as the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Act of 2006. The "Hyde Act" amends section 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act to permit civil nuclear cooperation with India. Through purchase of American nuclear fuel and technology, India hopes to augment its nuclear capacity by an additional 25,000 MW by 2020. Such large-scale nuclear collaboration is unprecedented. As part of the arrangement, India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has signed another agreement ensuring the separation of its civil and military nuclear facilities and the placement of its civil sector under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. Following years of exhaustive and often frustrating quasi-agreement, ratification of the treaty fell in the hands of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which granted India a waiver to access nuclear fuel and technology from other countries. This waiver heralds the emergence of the first nation to legally engage in nuclear commerce that is not a member of the International Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.

Despite the plethora of government officials and politicians who have lauded the act as a benchmark in cooperation between the world's two largest democracies, individuals on both sides have cautioned lawmakers about the potential unforeseen ramifications of the agreement. In Washington, some claim that that the deal is a major step backward for the NPT, to which all but four internationally-recognized sovereign states (Israel, North Korea, India, and Pakistan) are a party. Opponents of the treaty have argued that dealing commercially in nuclear fuel and infrastructure could legitimize the spread or sale of nuclear weapons by other nations. Such concerns have sparked fears that rampant proliferation could enable the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups. As one Chinese official commented, "Countries on the nuclear threshold might be tempted by the potential rewards of the Indian approach and pursue their nuclear weapon programs with renewed vigor. This new perspective might also affect negotiations over the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues." In New Delhi, groups opposed to the deal such as the Hindu Nationalists and Communists have lambasted it as impugning their national sovereignty and bringing Indian foreign policy too far under U.S. influence. Although we certainly will not see Washington's arbitration of Indian foreign policy in the near future, Indian officials have remarked on the extent to which the Bush Administration lobbied for approval in front of both the NSG and the IAEA, and India's hope to reciprocate in the future. However, the most ardent opposition to the treaty has certainly been India's longtime rival Pakistan, who was outraged by what it saw as a destabilization of the region's longstanding mutual deterrence. Only two days after the deal's approval by Congress, Pakistan's newly elected president Asif Ali Zardari clamored for a similar package from the United States. These demands have granted validity to concerns regarding the proliferative "slippery slope" being greased by the Bush Administration's headstrong policies.

Ultimately, the justifications for this endeavor have been three-fold. First, the United States recognizes, and intends to be a beneficiary of, the immense potential of the burgeoning Indian economy. Estimates by the Confederation of Indian Industry place immediate monetary gains resulting from renewed investment at $27 billion. In addition, the Nuclear Power Corp, which maintains a stranglehold monopoly on nuclear power in India, has selected primarily U.S. corporations such as General Electric and Westinghouse Electric as its predominant suppliers. Second, many have posited that the deal represents an attempted alliance against the surging economy and regional dominance of China. Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that "The United States is trying to cement its relationship with the world's largest democracy in order to counterbalance China." Finally, a handful of political analysts have commented that this proposition represents a last-ditch effort by the Bush Administration to ossify a foreign policy legacy with some nominal divergence from the infamy of the Iraq War. This might help to explain the unflappable ambition with which the Administration pursued the deal.

How then should we feel about the ultimate success of this inauspicious treaty? Perceptual and symbolic implications aside, this deal represents a very pragmatic move on the part of the U.S. both economically and geopolitically. As political ties entrench themselves, we can be assured that India will look to U.S. corporations for assistance in their development and evolution into a global force. Additionally, this deal may be the perfectly timed reassertion of American hegemony in the region, sending a subtle message to China that we do not necessarily "stand alone" against their predominance in Asia. Despite the seeming veracity of opponents' claims, most arguments against the deal greatly exaggerate the implicit dangers. Might the deal energize other nations towards nuclearization? Perhaps, but it certainly would not be the sole, or even primary, impetus behind such endeavors. Claims of international modeling do not carry any more significance to the India Nuclear Deal than did similar concerns that the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan would be a justification for preventive war by other powerful nations. Will the deal make rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea more intransigent? Unlikely. These countries will present themselves as quagmires for years to come, regardless of our dealings with other nations. Furthermore, such arguments lack coherence, as it is precisely the forbiddance of IAEA inspections (to which India agreed) by Iran and North Korea that prompt international condemnation and sanctions. If any modeling were to occur by these "axis" nations, then it would only serve to resolve our disputes. Perhaps the most relevant concern is a negative reaction by a frightened Pakistan driven to pre-emptive violence in fear of a reinvigorated India. Although rash violence is always a possibility, Pakistani fears will likely be ameliorated by India's successful compliance with IAEA regulations, which will ensure the non-military use of new nuclear material. Additionally, it is far too unfeasible this early in his career for the relatively moderate and politically precarious Zardari to incite violence between the two nations. More likely than not, Pakistan will simply be forced to adjust to a slightly less favorable status quo. So, like most other contentious international agreements, proverbial sabers will rattle until they are exposed as vacuous posturing and the world comes to accept a relatively benign treaty.