For a guy who (according to an improper translation of Farsi) wants to "wipe Israel off the map," Mahmoud Ahmadinejad struck largely conciliatory chords in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 23rd. In a significant step toward the recognition of some sort of Jewish state, Ahmadinejad supported a two-state solution. According to the language employed in his speech, the "Islamic Republic of Iran, while fully respecting the resistance of the oppressed people of Palestine...submits its humane solution based on a free referendum...for determining and establishing the type of state in the entire Palestinian lands to the distinguished Secretary General of the UN." Despite almost explicitly ruling out the Iranian military intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict feared by so many and espousing a policy favored by many Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans alike, Ahmadinejad is still branded as an "existential threat to the state of Israel." In an interview after his address, the president of Iran was asked point-blank whether or not Iran could live with an Israeli state. His response, consistent with his speech: "if [the Palestinians] want to keep the Zionists, they can stay... whatever the people decide, we will respect it." This embodies a dramatic policy shift on the part of Mr. Ahmadinejad given that most Palestinians would be amenable to a two-state solution.

Despite the astonishing reversal of Iranian policy regarding the state of Israel's right to exist, the American media has thus far reacted to Ahmadinejad's trip to the UN with the same vitriol that they are so keen to accuse Ahmadinejad of spewing. The only mention of his visit to New York during the first presidential debate was a reference to his "hate-mongering" speech that was apparently heavily laden with propaganda. Granted, Ahmadinejad's speech was rife with religious themes that seemed foreign to many Americans (just pretend to ignore the prevalence of Christianity, another Abrahamic religion, in American politics for a second) and he did not hesitate to express his discontent with American hegemony, but the speech on its own certainly did not warrant the extensive vilification and demonization dealt out by American politicians and members of the Western media.

Now, I, too, disagree with much of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and policy, but I adamantly reject the popular conception that he is a madman devoid of any rationality. If he fit such a description of a messianic maniac who would do anything to hasten Armageddon and the return of the Mahdi, why would he not have already attacked Israel? Why has Iran offered its assistance to the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq? Why did Iran back off when their "Hezbollah proxies" got tangled up in the summer 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon? The glaring answer to these questions is that the Iranian leadership is motivated by power politics (premised on rationality and self-interest) and can in fact be deterred by the threat of retaliation.

Compared to the likes of Mao Zedong, Josef Stalin, and Kim Jong Il, who have all actively engaged in the slaughter of millions, Ahmadinejad certainly seems like he could be dealt with rationally and under the auspices of the same deterrence theory and diplomatic tactics used with the aforementioned leaders. Just as those men "simulated irrationality" in order to serve domestic political purposes and attract international attention, Ahmadinejad could very well be doing the same. Some would say that his messianic militarism adds an element to the discussion that was not present with "atheists" like Stalin and Mao, but Iran's restraint in certain conflicts and cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to suggest otherwise. These actions demonstrate that Iran is a rational actor in the international arena, seeking to fill the power vacuum created by the fall of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. Perhaps all the Iranians want is to be treated as an equal member of the international community and accorded the respect they feel they deserve after almost thirty years of isolation and foreign meddling in their affairs.

Equally as important, regardless of any venomous rhetoric coming from the president's pulpit, is that anyone familiar with Iran's political structure can identify Ahmadinejad's lack of power. Yet American knowledge of the Iranian political system seems to have regressed since the presidency of Muhammad Khatami. Back then, American political pundits were quick to point out that his moderate outlook was meaningless because true decision-making authority rested solely with Ayatollah Ali Khameini, Iran's "Supreme Leader." However, these days, Ahmadinejad is incorrectly thought to wield some kind of ultimate authority in the Islamic Republic. Despite Khameini's occasional provocative statements, the evidence points to the conclusion that he is a pragmatic leader.

Instead of relying on symbolic discourse and political buzzwords that paint Iran as a post-Cold War rogue state (the postmodern "mythology of the other"), the United States should take steps to remove the stumbling blocks to productive dialogue that reinforce the negative images both nations hold of one another. The United States must make overtures to Iran and engage them in face-to-face diplomacy (not just via diplomatic intermediaries such as the Swiss).

Obama had the right idea, but is now retreating from his original position of unconditional engagement due to severe criticism from the right. One would hope that this retreat is only an ephemeral attempt to avoid being labeled as naÃOve and inexperienced by the McCain campaign. Rather than draw flawed analogies to Neville Chamberlain's actions in Munich, foreign policy hawks need to pick up a thesaurus and notice that "appeasement" and "engagement" are not synonymous.